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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 10-1583 
______________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
MAURICE LAMAR ROSS, 
 
         Appellant 
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Crim. No. 1:08-00019-001) 
Honorable John E. Jones, III, District Judge 
______________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 17, 2010 
 
BEFORE:  SLOVITER, GREENAWAY, JR., and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed:  February 9, 2011) 
______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge 
 
 This matter comes on before this Court on defendant-appellant Maurice Ross’s 
appeal from a sentence that the District Court imposed on him following an order 
granting the government’s motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 to 
correct the original sentence that it had imposed in this case.  The Court imposed both the 
original and corrected sentences on two counts of an indictment in a drug trafficking and 
firearms case in which Ross pleaded guilty to count one of the indictment, possession 
with intent to distribute cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), and to count two of the 
indictment, possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking, 18 U.S.C. § 
924(c).1  The Court held its original sentencing hearing on February 2, 2010, at which 
time it sentenced Ross to a custodial term of one day on count one and 60 months on 
count two, the terms to be consecutive.   
 Later on the day of the sentencing the government filed a motion to correct the 
sentence pursuant to Rule 35, contending that in imposing the sentence the District Court 
misapprehended the sentencing guidelines.  Ross answered that motion on February 3, 
2010, by filing a motion to strike the government’s motion on the ground that the original 
sentence was neither illegal as to its terms nor illegally imposed and thus Rule 35 did not 
grant the Court authority to change the sentence.  Nevertheless, on February 3, 2010, the 
Court issued a memorandum and order granting the government’s motion, vacating the 
original sentence, and rescheduling Ross’s sentencing.  Then the Court on February 12, 
2010, held a new sentencing hearing at which it sentenced Ross to a 90-month custodial 
term divided into 30 months on count one and 60 months on count two, the terms to be 
consecutive.  Later on that day it entered a judgment of conviction and sentence 
reflecting the new sentence.  Ross has filed a timely appeal from the February 12, 2010 
                                          
1 The indictment had a third count that the Court dismissed and, accordingly, we do not 
discuss that count. 
2 
 
sentence and the February 3, 2010 order granting the government’s motion to correct the 
original sentence.   
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and we have 
jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Inasmuch as Ross does not 
challenge the length of the sentence that the Court imposed on February 12, 2010, and 
limits his appeal to his contention that the Court did not have the authority to change the 
original sentence under Rule 35, we are exercising plenary review on this appeal.  See 
United States v. Ross, 557 F.3d 237, 239 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 We need not go into detail regarding the facts of this case as the parties are 
familiar with them.  Instead, it is sufficient to point out that Ross’s arrest and indictment 
arose from his activity as a retail drug vendor in the Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, area.  
After Ross’s guilty pleas the probation department prepared a presentence report in which 
it determined that Ross had 13 criminal history points and therefore had a Criminal 
History Category of VI.  The report indicated that Ross’s sentencing guidelines range was 
100 to 125 months for his drug trafficking conviction2 on count one and that the Court 
statutorily was obliged to impose a 60-month sentence on count two to run consecutively 
to the sentence on count one.  Ross, however, requested the Court to make a downward 
adjustment of his sentencing range predicated on his acceptance of responsibility, but the 
Court rejected that request as Ross had engaged in criminal conduct while on pretrial 
release pending the disposition of the charges in this case.  Ross, however, successfully 
                                          
2 Ross recognizes that the guideline range that the probation department calculated was 
“based upon the possession with the intent to distribute cocaine base count, and excluded 
from the calculation the firearms count under Section 924(c).”  Appellant’s br. at 5. 
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requested that the Court reduce his criminal history category of VI on the ground that a 
criminal history category of VI overrepresented his criminal history.  In granting that 
request, the Court reduced Ross’s criminal history category to IV.  Consequently, Ross’s 
sentencing guideline range was reduced to a range of 77 to 96 months on count one. 
 At the February 2, 2010 sentencing hearing, Ross sought a variance from his  
guidelines range because the range reflected the often challenged disparity between the 
powder and crack cocaine sentencing guidelines.  In this regard Ross asked the Court to 
adopt a one-to-one ratio between powder and crack cocaine, a proposal that if accepted 
would have reduced Ross’s sentencing guidelines range on count one to 30 to 37 months.  
The Court responded that it already had given Ross a significant reduction in the 
guidelines range and that, although a variance was warranted, it was not warranted to the 
extent of calculating the range on the basis of a one-to-one powder to crack ratio.  
Nevertheless, the Court imposed a sentence completely at odds with its stated intention, 
sentencing Ross to a one-day custodial term on count one and a consecutive custodial 
term of 60 months on count two.  Of course, the sentence that the Court imposed was far 
more advantageous to Ross than what his sentence would have been if the Court had 
granted him the benefit of a sentence based on a one-to-one powder to crack cocaine 
ratio, as Ross requested.   
 The government immediately concluded that the District Court had 
misapprehended the sentencing guidelines and reacted by filing its motion to correct 
Ross’s sentence.  Ross then responded to the government’s motion by filing his motion to 
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strike the government’s motion.  On February 3, 2010, the Court granted the 
government’s motion and explained its reason for doing so as follows: 
From the sentencing recommendation submitted by the 
Probation Officer, the Court was of the opinion that the 
guideline range expressed in ¶ 64 of the presentence report, 
100 to 125 months, was a composite guideline range that 
combined the guideline range applicable to Count I with the 
60 month mandatory minimum associated with Count II.  
Utilizing what we erroneously thought was a composite level, 
we then reduced it to 77 months to 96 months after we 
granted the Defendant a two-level downward departure in 
criminal history category pursuant to the overstatement 
provision contained in U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(b)(1).  
Consequently, at the time of sentencing, we were under the 
impression that the 77 month to 96 month range established 
in our January 25, 2010 Order . . . reflected an aggregated 
calculation of the respective  ranges associated with Counts I 
and II.  We sentenced the Defendant accordingly, proceeding 
under the theory that our sentence of 60 months and one day 
represented an approximate 17 month to 36 month variance 
from the guideline range. 
 
* * *  
 
 Therefore, while we initially intended to grant 
Defendant an approximate 17 month to 36 month variance in 
light of the crack/powder cocaine disparity, by sentencing 
Defendant to a term of 60 months and 1 day, we effectively 
afforded him an approximate 77 month to 96 month variance 
on Count I.  This was not at all our intent, and we cannot 
justify such an extreme variance given the factors expressed 
in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  Accordingly, we believe that justice 
dictates that we vacate the sentence imposed on this date and 
convene a future proceeding during which we resentence the 
Defendant. 
 
App. at 134-36. 
 The Court then went on to explain why Rule 35 was applicable: 
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In this case, we believe that we committed either a technical 
error or a clear error in fashioning a sentence that did not 
adequately or appropriately reflect the advisory guideline 
range associated with Count 1.  If we failed to correct this 
misstep and the Government elected to appeal we would 
certainly be confronted with resentencing the Defendant on 
remand from the Third Circuit.  Accordingly, we believe the 
procedure we are undertaking is wholly proper and 
appropriate pursuant to the dictates of Rule 35. 
 
App. at 136 n.3. 
 At the February 12, 2010 sentencing hearing the District Court again noted that it 
had made an error when it imposed Ross’s original sentence.  Then, after a 
comprehensive proceeding at which it fully entertained Ross’s contentions, the Court 
imposed consecutive custodial sentences of 30 months on count one and 60 months on 
count two, to be followed by concurrent three-year terms of supervised release.3  When 
imposing this 90-month custodial sentence the Court noted that the sentence reflected a 
variance based on the sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine.  Ross then 
appealed. 
 Rule 35(a), which is implicated on this appeal, provides that a court may correct a 
sentence “[w]ithin 14 days after sentencing, . . . [if the] sentence . . . resulted from 
arithmetical, technical, or other clear error.”  Inasmuch as the District Court imposed the 
original sentence on Ross on the basis of its erroneous sentencing guidelines calculation, 
we are satisfied that the Court appropriately relied on Rule 35(a) to order resentencing.  
                                          
3 The District Court also imposed a special assessment but we are not concerned with it 
on this appeal. 
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After all, it is obvious from what the Court said and did on February 2, 2010, that it made 
a “clear error” when it imposed the sentence on that day. 
 We think that it is beyond doubt that if the District Court had adhered to the 
sentence it originally imposed, in the likely event that the government had appealed we 
would have vacated the sentence and remanded the case for resentencing because the 
Court imposed the original sentence on the basis of its fundamental miscalculation of 
how it was granting a variance.  We also point out that if the District Court could have 
imposed a one-day sentence on count one to be followed by a 60-month mandatory 
sentence on count two, in effect the Court would have nullified the mandatory 
consecutive aspect of the 60-month sentence on count two for Congress surely intended 
that a mandatory consecutive sentence follow a sentence of more than nominal length.  
As a practical matter, a 60-month sentence to run consecutively to a one-day sentence is 
consecutive to hardly anything and thus, rather than being consecutive to a sentence on 
another count or counts, it is a substitute for the sentence on the other count or counts.   
 Here, as the District Court acknowledged, it made its error because it erroneously 
thought that the guideline range that the pretrial report set forth was a composite range 
based on both counts one and two, a misunderstanding that led it to believe that it was 
granting a variance from the guidelines sentencing range on both counts.  Of course, 
inasmuch as the range subject to the possibility of a variance was calculated only on 
count one, the variance was only from the range on that count and, contrary to its 
intention, the Court essentially wiped out the sentence on count one.     
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 The procedure to be followed on sentencing begins with the Court making a 
correct calculation of the applicable sentencing guidelines.  See United States v. Wise, 
515 F.3d 207, 216 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[A] district court must begin the process by correctly 
calculating the applicable Guidelines range.”); United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 
247 (3d Cir. 2006) (stating that “[c]ourts must continue to calculate a defendant’s 
Guidelines sentence precisely”).  Furthermore, the Supreme Court has made it clear that 
courts of appeals “must first ensure that the district court committed no significant 
procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines 
range.”  Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 597 (2007).  Although the 
sentencing guidelines are no longer mandatory, the change in the force of the guidelines 
from mandatory to advisory “does not render optional [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a)(4)’s 
direction to consider the Guidelines that are in effect on the date of the sentencing.”  
Wise, 515 F.3d at 220.  Thus, we have explained: 
Not for jurisdictional reasons, but rather because the 
Guidelines still play an integral role in criminal sentencing, 
we require that the entirety of the Guidelines calculation be 
done correctly, including rulings on Guidelines departures.  
Put another way, district courts must still calculate what the 
proper Guidelines sentencing range is, otherwise, the 
Guidelines cannot be considered properly . . . .  The scenario 
is simple:  error entering this sentencing step may presage the 
sentence ultimately set. 
 
United States v. Jackson, 467 F.3d 834, 838-39 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal citations and 
quotations omitted). 
 Beyond any doubt the District Court made a clear error when it originally 
misinterpreted the presentence investigation report as it believed that it was granting a 
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sentencing guideline variance of 17 to 36 months, rather than the 77 to 96 months 
variance that it granted.  The Court was right to correct its error by vacating the original 
sentence and resentencing Ross. 
 For the foregoing reasons we will affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence 
entered February 12, 2010. 
